487 U. S. 879
June 29, 1988
This case involved a dispute between the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Massachusetts about the HHS disallowing a reimbursement for Massachusetts health expenditures. Massachusetts wanted the claim heard in District Court, as ostensibly allowed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). HHS contended that the APA did not allow suits against it in District Court for “money damages,” and that, in any case, Massachusetts had an adequate remedy through suing in Claims Court under the Tucker Act.
The Court ruled 6-3 that a District Court could have jurisdiction. Stevens said that the phrase “money damages” was a legal term of art referring to monetary compensation for other harm done. By contrast, seeking merely to gain an amount of money legally due was known as asking for “monetary compensation.” Stevens said that legislative history, as well as a lower court opinion by no less of an authority than Robert Bork, proved this distinction. Thus, Massachusetts could still ask for a money judgment against HHS in District Court. Stevens also found that the Claims Court would not offer an adequate remedy. Those courts did not provide equitable relief, such as the declaratory and injunctive relief Massachusetts was also seeking. Furthermore, there was reason to believe that the Medicaid administration questions involved in the case were really beyond the scope of the Claims Court’s wheelhouse.
White concurred in judgment. He cryptically noted that he agreed with all of the majority’s ultimate conclusions, except for its statement that Massachusetts could request monetary compensation in District Court. He said that they would have to settle for mere declaratory and injunctive relief. Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy, dissented vigorously. He thought the majority’s distinction between “money damages” and “monetary relief” was total crap, and utterly unsupported by legal history. Almost any suit, he argued, to obtain money is a suit for “money damages.” Thus, the APA barred District Court jurisdiction. He also claimed that the majority’s reasons for holding that the Claims Court could not provide an adequate remedy were completely specious. The Claims Court was more than capable of taking the case and providing an adequate solution for Massachusetts.
Scalia made particular note that both of the case’s major holdings would effectively deprive the Claims Court of most of its docket, and cause a ream of other policy problems. He even predicted that lower courts would probably confine the ruling to its immediate facts, because trying to apply it would cause total chaos in the Claims Court. He closed with these words which I could not more heartily agree with: “Nothing is more wasteful than litigation about where to litigate, particularly when the options are all courts within the same legal system that will apply the same law. Today’s decision is a potential cornucopia of waste.”